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Man of might: Brigadier Berryman and the battles 
of Merdjayoun and Jezzine, Syria, 1941 
 
In June 1941 Brigadier Frank Berryman’s fearless and sometimes 
unorthodox leadership was instrumental in the Allied capture of 
Syria. 
 
By Dr Peter J Dean 
 
 
As the afternoon of the 14 June 1941 drew to a close Major John Wilton, 7th 
Division, Australian Imperial Force (AIF), sat beneath a beautiful fig tree in 
the town of Jezzine, Syria, and consumed “the most delicious figs [he’d] ever 
eaten”. Apart from a few other scant occasions, this was the first opportunity 
to relax since beginning of the Allied invasion of Vichy French Syria. Wilton 
looked over to his commanding officer and mentor Brigadier Frank 
Berryman, whom he greatly respected. Here was a man, thought Wilton, 
whose fearless and sometimes unorthodox leadership had been instrumental 
in the recent allied successes. Over the past week alone Berryman had 
planned a number of major attacks, conducted reconnaissances beyond the 
front line, accompanied the infantry in their assaults on two major strategic 
towns, captured prisoners, and had almost ambushed ”friendly” tanks with 
nothing more than a revolver. 
 
Berryman had arrived at the 7th Division as its senior brigadier fresh from the 
Libyan campaign. Under the command of Major-General John Lavarack, the 
7th Division formed the backbone of the Allied invasion of Vichy French Syria 
and Lebanon. The British, labouring under the false assumption that the 
Vichy French would only put up limited resistance, allocated few aircraft, no 
tanks, and limited infantry for the offensive. The Vichy French meanwhile 
had air superiority, more infantry, and two-thirds of an armoured division on 
hand. They were also were operating in terrain that was universally regarded 
as suited to defensive operations. The failure of the British to provide air and 
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tank support meant that Berryman’s artillery would be the sole major fire 
support available to the 7th Division for most of the campaign. 
 
The invasion commenced on the morning of 8 June 1941. The central thrust, 
under Brigadier Alfred Baxter-Cox’s 25th Brigade, AIF, soon ground to a halt 
and Lavarack ordered Berryman forward to assist Baxter-Cox to coordinate 
his advance. Upon arriving at the front, Berryman was appalled to find 
Baxter-Cox pushing his infantry into the attack without making use of his 
attached artillery regiment. Lavarack, arriving on the scene the next morning, 
removed the 2/6th Field Regiment from Baxter-Cox’s command and ordered 
Berryman’s headquarters forward with orders to coordinate the advance. 
 
Now in the leading role on the 25th Brigade front, Berryman organised for his 
regiments to shell Fort Khiam on 9 June, as well as assisting the 2/33rd 
Battalion’s assault on the village. In the afternoon Berryman organised a force 
of Bren-gun carriers to test the strength of the defenders at Khirbe, while the 
following day he conducted a reconnaissance for a deliberate assault against 
the town of Merdjayoun two days hence. 
 
These moves were not undertaken without considerable personal risk. 
Berryman, together with his reconnaissance force consisting of Wilton and 
Lieutenant Colonel Selwyn Porter, 2/31st Battalion, had advanced over 700 
metres beyond the infantry’s forward defensive line in order to prepare the 
attack on Merdjayoun. Berryman’s plan consisted of a flank attack on the high 
ground of Ibeles Saki, to the east, by the 2/25th Battalion and an assault along 
the main road to Merdjayoun by the 2/31st Battalion. Starting at 0230 hours 
on 11 June 1941 the attack made good progress, supported by the heaviest 
artillery bombardment of the campaign so far. Keen to maintain his presence 
with the troops, Berryman pushed forward, entering Khirbe with the infantry 
and personally capturing 12 prisoners. 
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Despite the obvious risks, Berryman continued to press forward during the 
attack, accompanying Porter and his troops as they entered Merdjayoun at 
1300 hours. Porter noted, “As we approached the civic centre, the flag of 
Lebanon broke at a mast head and we were invited to partake in champagne.” 
Berryman accepted the town’s surrender and immediately moved his artillery 
headquarters into the town.  
 
The French continued to fire on the town and Berryman’s answer to this 
persistence proved quite unorthodox. Lieutenant Colonel John O’Brien, 2/5th 
Field Regiment, had reported that the rough country beyond Merdjayoun 
made it difficult for his observation posts to locate the enemy artillery. 
Berryman’s staff, however, could see the enemy gun flashes from the second 
story of the headquarters’ building. Berryman, Wilton, and O’Brien went 
upstairs and immediately started to engage the French guns from an upstairs 
window by sending orders back to the 2/5th Field Regiment’s guns by 
telephone. They then proceeded out onto the balcony to observe the fall of 
shot. This action must be the only time during the war that an Australian 
divisional artillery headquarters also acted as a forward observation post for 
one of its own artillery regiments. 
 
For most senior officers coordinating a major assault, entering the objective 
with the leading troops, and then fulfilling the role of a forward artillery 
observer would have been more than enough for one action. Berryman, 
however, showing his characteristic abundance of energy, did not rest on his 
laurels. He spent the next couple of days coordinating the town’s defence, 
touring his batteries, and checking on his men. He then set off to join the 25th 
Brigade’s advance on the town of Jezzine. 
 
By morning on 14 June the advance guard of the 25th Brigade, consisting of 
the 2/31st Battalion supported by a troop from the 2/6th Field Regiment and 
a battery of the 2/2nd Anti-tank Regiment, had reached Kafr Houn. Soon 
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after Lavarack arrived at 25th Brigade headquarters he ordered Berryman ”to 
get Jezzine that night”.  
 
Patrols reported that Green Hill, the dominant high ground that held the key 
to Jezzine, was strongly held by the enemy. Berryman pushed forward to 
coordinate an attack with Porter, who had refused to be evacuated despite 
having been shot in the thigh by a French sniper at midday. As Porter’s men 
closed in on Green Hill, Berryman arranged for a troop of 25-pounder guns to 
close to within around 900 metres of the feature to support the assault. 
Despite the difficult terrain the attack proceeded at 1800hrs and was a 
complete success. 
 
With Porter incapacitated due to his wound, Berryman moved forward. 
Arriving on Green Hill to find the 2/31st Battalion consolidating its position, 
Berryman ”looked down and saw the town of Jezzine … [and] a big column 
of French troops moving to the north-east”. Grasping the importance of their 
position he ordered the artillery forward observer to shell the French column 
but the telephone line to the guns was down. In response Berryman turned to 
the nearest company commander, asserting ”well, you can see that they’re 
pulling out – go down and occupy the town.” The company set off down the 
precipitous cliff face ”swinging down the terraces with the help of vines and 
the branches of trees”. 
 
Unwilling to be left behind Berryman forged on with the platoon, initially 
waiting on the road as the men approached the town. As the light started to 
fade, the increasingly anxious Berryman announced he was tired of waiting 
and again set off to lead the advance. He halted inside the town as the troops 
moved among the streets to clear them of the enemy. By now the sun had 
faded and Berryman heard the unmistakable rumble of approaching tanks. 
He knew that no Allied tanks had accompanied the force to Jezzine and, 
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assuming that they were French tanks that had moved down from Damour to 
resist the Australian advance he took action. Wilton later recalled: 
There were some rather broken down farmhouses on the 
side of the road, so Berryman said “We’ll hide ourselves in 
here behind the wall … I think there are only two tanks”. We 
looked back and there were just these dark objects coming 
along the road … with the turrets open and the tank 
commander standing up and looking out … We crouched 
there with our pistols cocked. The tanks rumbled along and 
just before the first tank passed me we heard a good 
Australian voice … It was a troop of tanks from the 9th 
Australian Division Cavalry, which by this time had got to 
the road junction which led from Damour to Jezzine, and 
they’d been sent out to make contact with our little party. 
But they didn’t tell us, and those chaps were only about ten 
seconds away from being shot. 
 
Relieved at their good fortune Berryman and Wilton rode the light tanks into 
Jezzine, where they found the leading infantry platoon drinking wine with 
the town’s mayor. Berryman’s daring advance had forestalled the French plan 
to occupy the town in strength the following day. 
 
It was here that Berryman and Wilton were able to relax under the beautiful 
fig tree. It had been an amazing week for the two officers. But the reprieve 
would be only temporary, as the capture of Jezzine was not the end of the 
campaign but rather marked the beginning of the most crucial phase of the 
invasion. Before long Berryman was rushing back to Merdjayoun to take 
command of an ad-hoc brigade in an attempt to stem the tide of a Vichy 
French counter-attack that threatened the entire invasion. The tough first 
week of fighting and the counter-attack proved to the British High Command 
that Syria was no push over. Berryman fearless and unorthodox leadership 
was to continue to play a major a role in the campaign as he, the 7th 
Australian Division, and the newly operational 1st Australian Corps battled 
through another month of hard fighting before victory was secured. 
 
About the author 
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